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Abstract
Empirical demand models used for counterfactual predictions and welfare analysis must be
rationalizable, i.e. theoretically consistent with utility maximization by heterogeneous con-
sumers. We show that for binary choice under general unobserved heterogeneity, rationaliz-
ability is equivalent to a pair of Slutsky-like shape-restrictions on choice-probability functions.
The forms of these restrictions di¤er from Slutsky-inequalities for continuous goods. Unlike
McFadden-Richters stochastic revealed preference, our shape-restrictions (a) are global, i.e.
their forms do not depend on which and how many budget-sets are observed, (b) are closed-
form, hence easy to impose on parametric/semi/non-parametric models in practical applications,
and (c) provide computationally simple, theory-consistent bounds on demand and welfare pre-
dictions on counterfactual budget-sets.
1 Introduction
Many important economic decisions faced by individuals are binary in nature, including labour force
participation, retirement, college enrolment, adoption of a new technology or health product, and
so forth. This paper concerns nonparametric analysis of binary choice under general unobserved
heterogeneity and income e¤ects. The paper has two goals. The rst is to understand, theo-
retically, what nonparametric restrictions does utility maximization by heterogeneous consumers
impose upon choice-probabilities, i.e. whether there are analogs of Slutsky restrictions for binary
Keywords: Binary choice, general heterogeneity, income e¤ect, utility maximization, integrabil-
ity/rationalizability, Slutsky inequality, shape-restrictions. JEL Codes: C14, C25, D12.
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choice under general unobserved heterogeneity and income e¤ects, and conversely, whether these
restrictions are also su¢ cient for observed choice-probabilities to be rationalizable. This issue is
important for logical coherency between theory and empirics and, in particular, for prediction of
demand and welfare in situations involving counterfactual, i.e. previously unobserved, budget sets.
It is important in these exercises to allow for general unobserved heterogeneity, because economic
theory typically does not restrict its dimension or distribution, and does not specify how it enters
utility functions. To date, closed-form Slutsky conditions for rationalizability of demand under gen-
eral heterogeneity were available only for continuous choice. The present paper, to our knowledge,
is the rst to establish them for the leading case of discrete demand, viz. binary choice.
The second goal of the present paper is a practical one. It is motivated by the fact that in
empirical applications of binary choice, requiring the estimation of elasticities, welfare calculations
and demand predictions, researchers typically use parsimonious functional-forms for conditional
choice probabilities. This is because fully nonparametric estimation is often hindered by curse of
dimensionality, the sensitivity of estimates to the choice of tuning parameters and insu¢ cient price
variation, especially in consumer data from developed countries. The question therefore arises as to
whether the economic theory of consumer behavior can inform the choice of such functional forms.
Answering this question is our second objective.
Since McFadden, 1973, discrete choice models of economic behavior have been studied exten-
sively in the econometric literature, mostly under restrictive assumptions on utility functions and
unobserved heterogeneity including, inter alia, quasi-linear preferences implying absence of income
e¤ects and/or parametrically specied heterogeneity distributions (c.f. Train, 2009 for a text-
book treatment). Matzkin (1992) investigated the nonparametric identication of binary choice
models with additive heterogeneity, where both the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and
the functional form of utilities were left unspecied. More recently, Bhattacharya (2015, 2018)
has shown that in discrete choice settings, welfare distributions resulting from price changes are
nonparametrically point-identied from choice probabilities without any substantive restriction on
preference heterogeneity, and even when preference distribution and heterogeneity dimension are
not identied.
In the present paper, we consider a setting of binary choice by a population of budget-constrained
consumers with general, unobserved heterogeneity. In this setting, we develop a characterization of
utility maximization which takes the form of simple, closed-form shape restrictions on choice prob-
ability functions in the population. These nonparametric shape-restrictions can be consistently
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tested in the usual asymptotic econometric sense and are extremely easy to impose on speci-
cations of choice-probabilities akin to testing or imposing monotonicity of regression functions.
Most importantly, they lead to computationally simple bounds for theory-consistent demand and
welfare predictions on counterfactual budgets sets an important goal of empirical demand analy-
sis. Interestingly, our shape-restrictions di¤er in form from the well-known Slutsky inequalities for
continuous goods.
The above results are developed in a fully nonparametric context; nonetheless, they can help
guide applied researchers intending to use simple parametric or semiparametric models. As a
specic example, consider the popular probit/logit type model for binary choice of whether to buy
a product or not. A standard specication is that the probability of buying depends (implicitly
conditioning on other observed covariates) on its price p and the decision-makers income y, e.g.
q (p; y) = F (0 + 1p+ 2y), where F () is a distribution function. We will show below that
these choice-probabilities are consistent with utility maximization by a heterogenous population
of consumers, if and only if 1  0, and 1 + 2  0. While the rst inequality simply means
that demand falls with own price (holding income xed), the second inequality is less obvious, and
constitutes an important empirical characterization of utility maximization.
For the case of continuous goods, Lewbel, 2001 explored the question of when average demand,
generated from maximization of heterogeneous individual preferences, satises standard properties
of non-stochastic demand functions. More recently, for the case of two continuous goods (i.e.
a good of interest plus the numeraire) under general heterogeneity, Hausman and Newey, 2016
have shown that constrained utility maximization is equivalent to quantiles of demand satisfying
standard Slutsky negativity. The analog of the two goods setting in discrete choice is the case of
binary alternatives. Accordingly, our main result (Theorem 1 below) may be viewed as the discrete
choice counterpart of Hausman and Newey, 2016, Theorem 1. Note however that quantiles are
degenerate for binary outcomes, and indeed, the forms of our Slutsky-like shape restrictions are
completely di¤erent from Hausman-Neweys quantile-based conditions for continuous choice.
An alternative, algorithmic as opposed to closed-form and analytic approach to rationaliz-
ability of demand is the so-called revealed stochastic preference(SRP, henceforth) method, which
applies to very general choice settings where a heterogeneous population of consumers faces a nite
number of budget sets, c.f. McFadden and Richter, 1990, McFadden, 2005. When budget sets
are numerous or continuously distributed, as in household surveys with many income and/price
values, SRP is well-known to be operationally prohibitive, c.f. Anderson et al 1992, Page 54-5
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and Kitamura and Stoye, 2016, Sec 3.3. Furthermore, the SRP conditions are di¢ cult to impose
on parametric specications commonly used in practical applications, they change entirely in form
upon addition of new budget sets, and are cumbersome to use for demand prediction on counter-
factual budgets, especially in welfare calculations that typically require simultaneous prediction on
a continuous range of budget-sets. In contrast, our approach yields rationality conditions which (a)
are global, in that they characterize choice probability functions, and their forms remain invariant
to which and how many budget sets are observed in a dataset, and (b) are closed-form, analytic
shape-restrictions, hence easy to impose, standard to test, and simple to use for counterfactual
predictions of demand and welfare. As such, these shape-restrictions establish the analogs of Slut-
sky conditions  the cornerstone of classical demand analysis  for binary choice under general
unobserved heterogeneity and income e¤ects.
2 The Result
Consider a population of heterogeneous individuals, each choosing whether or not to buy an indi-
visible good. Let N represent the quantity of numeraire which an individual consumes in addition
to the binary good. If the individual has income Y = y, and faces a price P = p for the indivisible
good, then the budget constraint is N + pQ = y where Q 2 f0; 1g represents the binary choice. In-
dividuals derive satisfaction from both the indivisible good as well as the numeraire. Upon buying,
an individual derives utility from the good but has a lower amount of numeraire y   p left; upon
not buying, she enjoys utility from her outside option and a higher quantity of numeraire y. There
is unobserved heterogeneity across consumers which a¤ect their choice, and so on each budget set
dened by a price p and consumer income y, there is a (structural) probability of buying, denoted
by q (y; y   p); that is, if each member of the entire population were o¤ered income y and price p,
then a fraction q (y; y   p) would buy the good. It is more standard to write this choice probability
as conditional on price and income, i.e., in the form q (p; y), but the equivalent q (y; y   p) expres-
sion is an important and helpful step toward obtaining closed-form rationalizability results, as will
become clear below. Indeed, one can go back and forth between the two specications because
q (c; d)  q (d; d  c) and q (a; b)  q (a  b; a). Also, for now, we implicitly condition our analysis
on observed covariates, and later show how to incorporate them into the results.
Our main result establishes conditions that are necessary and su¢ cient for the conditional choice
probability function to be generated from utility maximization by a heterogeneous population,
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where no a priori restriction is imposed on the dimension and functional form of the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity or on the functional form of utilities.
Theorem 1 For binary choice under general heterogeneity, the following two statements are equiv-
alent:
(i) The structural choice probability function q (; ), dened above, satises that (A) q (a; b) is
non-increasing in a for each xed b, and non-decreasing in b for each xed a; (B) for each xed
b 2 R, it holds that lima# 1 q (a; b) = 1, and (C) q (a; b) is continuous in a for each xed b.
(ii) There exists a pair of utility functions W0 (; ) and W1 (; ), where the rst argument
denotes the amount of numeraire, and  denotes unobserved heterogeneity, and a distribution G ()
of  such that
q (a; b) =
Z
1 fW0 (a; ) W1 (b; )g dG () ,
where (A) for each xed , W0 (a; ) is continuous and strictly increasing in a, and W1 (b; ) is
non-decreasing in b; (B) for each xed b and , W1 (b; ) > lima# 1W0 (a; ); (C) for any a; b, it
holds that
R
1 fW1 (b; ) = W0 (a; )g dG () = 0.
Intuitively, conditions (A/A) mean that having more numeraire ceteris paribus is (weakly)
better for every consumer. To interpret condition (B), note that for xed b, lima# 1 q (a; b) 
lim(a b)# 1 q (a; b). Now, since a   b = p is the price, condition (B/B) say that everyone can be
persuaded to buy product 1 by making its price low enough (perhaps even negative). Condition
(C/C) the no-tieassumption is standard in discrete choice models, and intuitively means that
there is a continuum of tastes. Note that (A)-(C) place no restriction on income e¤ects, including
its sign.
In statement (ii), the functionsWj (x; ) will correspond to the utility from choosing alternative
j 2 f0; 1g and being left with a quantity x of the numeraire, and with  denoting unobserved
heterogeneity. This notation allows for the case where di¤erent vectors of unobservables enter
the two utilities, i.e. where the utilities are given by u0 (; 0) and u1 (; 1), respectively, with
0 6= 1; simply set   (0; 1), W0 (; )  u0 (; 0), W1 (; )  u1 (; 1). In the proof of the
above theorem, when showing (ii) implies (i),  will be allowed to have any arbitrary and unknown
dimension and distribution; in showing (i) implies (ii) we will construct a scalar heterogeneity
distribution that will rationalize the choice probabilities (see further discussion on this point under
the heading "Observational Equivalence" in the next section).
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Proof. That (ii) implies (i) is straightforward. In particular, letting W 10 (; ) denote the inverse
of W0 (; ), we have that
q (a; b) =
Z
1

a W 10 (W1 (b; ) ; )
	
dG ()
whence (C) implies continuity of q (; b), (B) implies that lima# 1 q (a; b) = 1 for each b, and (A)
implies (A).
We now show that (i) implies (ii). Note that lima# 1 q (a; b) = 1 for each b implies that for any
u 2 [0; 1] and b 2 R, the set fx : q (x; b)  ug is non-empty. For any xed b 2 R and for u 2 [0; 1],
dene
q 1 (u; b) def= sup fx : q (x; b)  ug . (1)
By condition (A) in (i), q 1 (u; ) must be non-decreasing. Now, consider a random variable V '
Uniform (0; 1). DeneW0 (a; V )
defn
= a andW1 (b; V )
defn
= q 1 (V; b), and note that by construction,
W0 (a; V ) and W1 (b; V ) satisfy properties (A)-(C) listed in (ii) above. We will now show that
W0 (; V ) and W1 (; V ) will rationalize the choice-probabilities q (; ).
Indeed, given any xed b, since q (; b) is continuous and non-increasing, we have that for any
v 2 (0; 1),
a  q 1 (v; b) by q(;b) non"=) q (a; b)  q  q 1 (v; b) ; b by q(;b) cont:=) q (a; b)  v. (2)
To see why continuity is required for the last implication in (2), suppose for some v 2 (0; 1), we
have that q (x; b) > v for all x < c, but q (c; b) < v, i.e. q (; b) takes a discontinuous plungeat
c. Then q 1 (v; b) = sup fx : q (x; b)  vg = c, but q (c; b) = q  q 1 (v; b) ; b < v. Continuity of
q (; b) rules this out, and guarantees that q (c; b) = q  q 1 (v; b) ; b  v; therefore, in (2), q (a; b) 
q
 
q 1 (v; b) ; b

=) q (a; b)  v.
Finally, by denition of q 1 (; b) as the supremum in (1), we have that
q (a; b)  v =) a  q 1 (v; b) . (3)
Therefore, by (2) and (3), we have that q (a; b)  v () a  q 1 (v; b), and thus, for V ' U (0; 1),
it follows that
Pr
 
q 1 (V; b)  a = Pr (V  q (a; b)) = q (a; b) .
Therefore, the utility functions W0 (a; V )  a and W1 (b; V )  q 1 (V; b) with heterogeneity V '
Uniform (0; 1) rationalize the choice probabilities q (; ), and satisfy all the properties specied in
panel (ii) of Theorem 1. In particular, W1 (b; ) is non-decreasing in b (see (1)).
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3 Discussion
A. Slutsky Form: To see the analogy between the shape restrictions in Theorem 1 and the
traditional Slutsky inequality constraints with smooth demand, rewrite the choice probability on a
budget set (p; y) in the standard form as a function of price and income, viz. q (p; y)  q (y; y   p)
i.e., q (a; b)  q (a  b; a). Then, under continuous di¤erentiability, the shape restrictions (A) from
Theorem 1 are equivalent to @@b q (a  b; a) = @@bq (a; b)  0, and @@a q (a  b; a) = @@aq (a; b)  0, i.e.,
for all p; y,
@
@p
q (p; y)  0, (4)
@
@p
q (p; y) +
@
@y
q (p; y)  0. (5)
The forms of these inequalities are distinct from textbook Slutsky conditions for nonstochastic
demand q (p; y) for a continuous good, which are given by
@
@p
q (p; y) + q (p; y)
@
@y
q (p; y)  0 for all p; y. (6)
For a continuous good and under general unobserved heterogeneity, Hausman and Newey, 2016 show
that (6) also holds with q (p; y) denoting any quantile of the demand distribution for xed (p; y)
(see also Dette, Hoderlein and Neumeyer, 2016). Thus, for binary choice with general heterogeneity,
the forms of the Slutsky inequality (4) and (5) are di¤erent from the continuous choice counterpart
(6).1 In particular, the inequalities (4) and (5) are linear in q (; ) (and q (; )), unlike (6), and
hence easier to impose on nonparametric estimates of q (; ) using, say, shape-preserving sieves that
guarantee that @@b q^ (a; b)  0, and @@a q^ (a; b)  0 for all a; b.
Remark 1 It is tempting to think of (4) and (5) as (6) with the level q (p; y) replaced by 0 and
1 corresponding to either of the two possible individual choices. However, this interpretation is
incorrect, since q (p; y) is average demand, and takes values strictly inside (0; 1). In other words,
q (p; y) is neither a quantile, nor individual demand at price p and y, and generically (e.g. in a
probit model) does not take the values of 0 and 1. Thus (4) and (5) cannot be rewritten as
@
@p
q (p; y) + q (p; y)
@
@y
q (p; y)  0 for all p; y,
and, as such, are di¤erent from the continuous choice counterpart (6).
1Bhattacharya, 2015 (see also Lee and Bhattacharya, 2018) noted that (4) (resp, (5)) is necessary for the CDF of
equivalent variation (resp., compensating variation) resulting from price-changes to be non-decreasing.
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B. Observational Equivalence: The construction in our proof of (ii) ) (i) shows that a
rationalizable binary choice model with general heterogeneity of unspecied dimension is obser-
vationally equivalent to one where a scalar heterogeneity enters the utility function of one of the
alternatives in a monotonic way, and the utility of the other alternative is non-stochastic.2 An intu-
itive explanation of this equivalence is that in the binary case, choice probabilities are determined
solely by the marginal distribution of reservation price (given income) for alternative 1, and not
the relative ranking of individual consumers in terms of their preferences within that distribution.
So, as income varies, choice probabilities change only insofar as the marginal distribution of the
reservation price changes, irrespective of how individual consumersrelative positions change within
that distribution.
It is worth pointing out here that a binary choice model with additive scalar heterogeneity 
the so-called ARUM model is restrictive, and not observationally equivalent to a binary choice
model with general heterogeneity. To see this, suppose choice probabilities are generated via the
ARUM model, viz.
q (a; b) = Pr [W1 (b) + 1 > W0 (a) + 0]
= Pr [0   1 < W1 (b) W0 (a)]
= F0 1 [W1 (b) W0 (a)] . (7)
Assuming smoothness and strict monotonicity of F0 1 [], W1 () and W0 (), and thus of q (; ), it
follows that
@2
@a@b
ln
"
 
@
@bq (a; b)
@
@aq (a; b)
#
=
@2
@a@b
ln

W 01 (b)
W 00 (a)

, from (7)
=
@2
@a@b

ln
 
W 01 (b)
  ln  W 00 (a)
= 0,
for every a and b. This equality is obviously not true for a general smooth and strictly monotone
q (; ) satisfying Assumptions i(A)-i(C) of Theorem 1.
2For quantile demand in the continuous case, a result of similar spirit is discussed in Hausman-Newey, 2016, Page
1228-9, following Theorem 1. In general, a result holding for the continuous case with two goods does not necessarily
imply that it also holds for the binary case. For example, welfare related results are di¤erent for the binary and
the two-good continuous case, c.f. Hausman-Newey 2016, and Bhattacharya 2015, and so are Slutsky negativity
conditions, as discussed above.
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Remark 2 The construction of q 1 (V; ) in our proof of (ii) ) (i) is unrelated to the almost sure
representation of a continuous random variable X as F 1X (U) with U = FX (X), where FX and
F 1X denote the CDF and quantile function of X, and U is U (0; 1). Indeed, if we were to apply this
so-called "probability-integral transform" to X = W1 (a1; ) for a xed a1, we will haveW1 (a1; )
a:s:
=
F 1W1(a1;) (U (a1)), where the scalar-valued uniform process U (a1)  FW1(a1;) (W1 (a1; )) will vary
with a1, unlike V in the proof of our theorem above, and therefore cannot represent unobserved
heterogeneity in consumer preferences. In other words, our constructed q 1 (V; a1) will not equal
the data generating process W1 (a1; ) almost surely, but the probability that q 1 (V; a1)  a0 will
equal the probability that W1 (a1; ) W0 (a0; ) for all (a0; a1).
C. Gi¤en Goods: Our rationalizability condition (4) says that own price e¤ect on average
demand is negative. This condition has no counterpart in the continuous case, appears to rule
out Gi¤en behavior and may, therefore, appear restrictive. We now show that that is not the
case: indeed, Gi¤en goods cannot arise in binary choice models if utilities are non-satiated in the
numeraire. To see this, let the utility of options 0 and 1 be given by W0 (; ) and W1 (; ) as in
Theorem 1 above. Now note that if option 1 is Gi¤en for an  type consumer with income y, then
for some prices p < p0 she buys at price p0 but does not buy at p. Therefore,
W1 (y   p; ) < W0 (y; ) < W1
 
y   p0;  ,
which is a contradiction, since W1 (; ) is strictly increasing. In contrast, consider a continuous
good with utilities W (x; y   px; ), where x denotes the quantity of the continuous good, and
W (; ; ) is increasing in both arguments. Now it is possible that x is bought at price p and x0 is
bought at price p0 with p < p0 and x < x0. That is, we can have
W (x; y   px; ) < W  x0; y   p0x0;  ,
if x0 is preferred su¢ ciently over x. The intuitive reason for this di¤erence between the discrete and
the continuous case is that in the former, the only non-zero option is 1. Indeed, in the continuous
case, it is also not possible that W (x; y   px; ) < W (x; y   p0x; ) for any common x if p < p0.
Also, note that although Gi¤en behavior cannot arise in binary choice, there is no restriction
on the sign of the income e¤ect. Indeed, (4) and (5) are compatible with both @@y q (p; y)  0 and
@
@y q (p; y)  0.
9
D. Parametric and Semiparametric Models: For a probit/logit specication of the buying
decision, viz.
q (p; y)
= F (0 + 1p+ 2y)
= F (0 + (1 + 2) y   1 (y   p)) , (8)
where F () is a strictly increasing CDF, the shape restrictions of Theorem 1 amount to requiring
1  0 and 1 + 2  0. While the rst inequality is intuitive, and simply says that own price
e¤ect is negative, the second condition 1+2  0 is not a priori obvious, and shows the additional
restriction implied by budget-constrained utility maximization. Now, applying Theorem 1, we
obtain
F (0 + (1 + 2) y   1 (y   p))
= Pr (V  F (0 + (1 + 2) y   1 (y   p)))
= Pr

F 1 (V )  0 + 1 (y   p)
1 + 2
 y

,
since 1 + 2 < 0 (note that the condition lima# 1 q (a; b) = 1 for each b rules out 1 + 2 = 0),
implying the rationalizing utility functions
U1 (y   p; V ) = F
 1 (V )  0
1 + 2
+

1
1 + 2

| {z }
>0
(y   p) ,
U0 (y; V ) = y.
where V ' U (0; 1).
Remark 3 Note that since the restrictions 1  0 and 1 + 2  0 are linear in parameters, it is
computationally straightforward to maximize a globally concave likelihood, such as probit or logit,
subject to these constraints.
The above discussion also applies to semiparametric models where one need not specify the
exact functional form of F (). For example, the semiparametric method of Bhattacharya (2008),
which only utilizes the strict monotonicity of the CDF F (), can be applied to estimate the binary
choice model, subject to our sign restriction and standard scale-normalization, viz. 1 =  1 and
1 + 2  0, i.e. using the specication that q (p; y) is a strictly increasing function of the linear
index  p+ 2y with 2  1.
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E. Random Coe¢ cients: An alternative parametric specication in this context is a random
coe¢ cient structure, popular in IO applications. It takes the form
Pr (1jprice = p; income = y)
=
Z
F (1p+ 2y) dG (1; 2; )
=
Z
F ((1 + 2) y   1 (y   p)) dG (1; 2; )
 H (y; y   p; ) ,
where 1 and 2 are now random variables with joint distribution G (; ; ), indexed by an un-
known parameter vector , and F () is a specied CDF (e.g. a logit). Theorem 1 then implies
that the distribution G (; ; ) must be such that the choice probability function H (; ; ) satises
@
@yH (y; ; )  0 and @@(y p)H (; y   p; )  0. One way to guarantee this would be to specify the
support of 1 and of 1 + 2 to lie in ( 1; 0). Using Theorem 1, a utility structure that would
rationalize such a model is:
U1 (y   p; ) = h (y   p; V; ) ; U0 (y; ) = y,
where V ' U (0; 1), and h (y   p; v; ) is sup fx : H (x; y   p; )  vg.3
F. Counterfactuals: Theorem 1 can be used to nonparametrically predict theory-consistent
choice probabilities on counterfactual, i.e. previously unobserved, budget-sets. Obviously, without
shape restrictions, there is no nonparametric restriction on demand on counterfactual budgets. To
see how to use shape-restrictions, let A denote the set of (p; y) observed in the data. Then, using
part (i) condition (A) of our theorem, the probability q (p0; y0) of buying at counterfactual (i.e.
previously unobserved) price p0 and income y0 can be bounded as
q
 
p0; y0
  q  y0; y0   p0 2
264 sup
(p;y)2A: yy0;
y py0 p0
q (y; y   p) ; inf
(p;y)2A: yy0;
y py0 p0
q (y; y   p)
375 . (9)
The above calculation is extremely simple; for example, the lower bound requires collecting those
observed budget sets (p; y) in the data that satisfy y  y0; y   p  y0   p0 (a one-line command in
STATA), evaluating choice probabilities on them, and sorting these values.
3Note that an alternative preference distribution producing the same choice probabilities is given by U1 (y   p; ) =
 1 (y   p), U0 (y; ) = 0   (1 + 2) y, 0 ? (1; 2), 0 ' F (), (1; 2) ' G (; ; ), 1 < 0, 1 + 2  0 w.p.1.
This shows that the rationalizing preference distribution may not be unique.
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G. Welfare bounds: Given bounds on choice probabilities, one can obtain lower and up-
per bounds on economically interesting functionals thereof, such as average welfare. For example,
the average compensating variation  i.e. utility preserving income compensation  correspond-
ing to a price change from p0 to p1 at income y is given by
R p1
p0
q (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp (c.f.
Bhattacharya, 2015).4 This requires prediction of demand on a continuum of budget sets, viz.
fq (y + p  p0; y   p0) : p 2 [p0; p1]g. Now, it follows from our discussion above, and by Theorem 1,
that pointwise bounds on q (y + p  p0; y   p0) are given by
L (y + p  p0; y   p0)  sup
(p0;y0)2A, y0 p0y p0, y0y+p p0
q
 
y0; y0   p0
 q (y + p  p0; y   p0)
 inf
(p0;y0)2A, y0 p0y p0, y0y+p p0
q
 
y0; y0   p0 M (y + p  p0; y   p0) .(10)
This implies that average CV at y is bounded below by
R p1
p0
L (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp, and above byR p1
p0
M (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp.
We can, in fact, make a stronger statement, viz., that the smallest set S (y; p0; p1) containing all
feasible values of the average CV, based on the restrictions of Theorem 1, is given by the interval
I (y; p0; p1)
=
Z p1
p0
L (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp;
Z p1
p0
M (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp

.
This assertion requires a justication, because I (y; p0; p1) includes integrals of functions that violate
the shape restrictions of Theorem 1 but nonetheless satisfy the pointwise bounds (10). That
justication is as follows. First note that by denition, the set S (y; p0; p1) is given by
S (y; p0; p1) =
Z p1
p0
f (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp, f 2 F

,
where F is the collection of all functions f (; ) : R  R ! [0; 1], satisfying the conditions (i) of
Theorem 1, viz. non-increasing and continuous in the rst argument and non-decreasing in the
second argument, satisfying L (y + p  p0; y   p0)  f (y + p  p0; y   p0) M (y + p  p0; y   p0)
for all p 2 [p0; p1].5 We want to show that I (y; p0; p1) = S (y; p0; p1).
First, note that S (y; p0; p1) v I (y; p0; p1), because by denition, L (y + p  p0; y   p0) 
f (y + p  p0; y   p0) M (y + p  p0; y   p0) for each p, and I (y; p0; p1) is a connected interval.
4The results in Bhattacharya (2015) are stated in terms of the standard forms of choice probabilities, viz.
q (p; y) in our notation above. In particular, average CV is
R p1
p0
q (p; y + p  p0) dp which, in our present notation, isR p1
p0
q (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp.
5The limit condition (B) in Theorem 1 can be dropped in dening S because y; p0; p1 are all nite.
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Now, we show that I (y; p0; p1) v S (y; p0; p1). To see this, note that we can write any i 2
I (y; p0; p1) as
i =  (i)
Z p1
p0
L (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp+ (1   (i))
Z p1
p0
M (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp
=
Z p1
p0
264 (i) L (y + p  p0; y   p0) + (1   (i))M (y + p  p0; y   p0)| {z }
=H(i)(y+p p0;y p0), say
375 dp,
for some real number  (i) 2 (0; 1). But by denition, for every  2 [0; 1], the function
H (y + p  p0; y   p0)
  L (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp+ (1  )M (y + p  p0; y   p0)
belongs to F , since both L (y + p  p0; y   p0) and M (y + p  p0; y   p0), by denition, belong
to F , and monotonicity and continuity are preserved under convex additions. Hence the integral
i =
R p1
p0
H(i) (y + p  p0; y   p0) dp 2 S (y; p0; p1), and thus I (y; p0; p1) v S (y; p0; p1). Intuitively,
even if I (y; p0; p1) contains the integral (say of value v) of a function satisfying the pointwise
bounds but not the shape restrictions, there is another function satisfying the shape restrictions
and respecting the same pointwise bounds, whose integral has the same magnitude v.
H. Compatibility with SRP: The welfare calculation above requires prediction of demand
on a continuum of budget sets indexed by p 2 [p0; p1], which is operationally di¢ cult  if not
practically impossible  to implement, using the nite-dimensional matrix equation based SRP
approach. But in simple cases where there are a small, countably nite number of budget sets, and
it is easy to verify the SRP conditions, a natural question is whether our shape restrictions i(A)
of Theorem 1 are compatible with the SRP based criterion for rationalizability; condition i(B) and
i(C) of Theorem 1 are of course irrelevant in such cases. Indeed, it is not hard to show that our
shape restrictions are in fact necessary for the SRP criterion to be satised. To see this, suppose
we observe behavior on two budget sets corresponding to price and income equal to
 
p1; y

and 
p2; y

. Let a0 = y and a
j
1 = y   pj for j = 1; 2. Then there are three alternatives to consider, viz.
(0; a0) ;
 
1; a11

and
 
1; a21

. WLOG assume p1 < p2, i.e. a11 > a
2
1. Under nonsatiation in numeraire,
there are 3 possible preference proles in the population, given by (i) (0; a0) 
 
1; a11
   1; a21, (ii) 
1; a11
  (0; a0)   1; a21 and (iii)  1; a11   1; a21  (0; a0); assume the population proportions of
these three proles are (1; 2; 3), respectively. Let q
 
a0; a
1
1

, q
 
a0; a
2
1

denote choice probabilities
of alternative 1 on the two budgets, respectively. Then the SRP approach asks whether matrix
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equation
24 0 1 1
0 0 1
35
26664
1
2
3
37775 =
24 q  a0; a11
q
 
a0; a
2
1

35 , i.e.
2 + 3 = q
 
a0; a
1
1

, 3 = q
 
a0; a
2
1

, (11)
has a solution (1; 2; 3) in the unit positive simplex. Clearly, we need that 2 + 3  3 (guar-
anteeing 2  0) which is precisely our shape restriction q
 
a0; a
1
1
  q  a0; a21 (as a11 > a21).
Similarly, by considering the budget sets
 
p1; y1

and
 
p2; y2

with y1 < y2 and y1   p1 = y2  
p2  a1, say and a10  y1 < y2  a20, one can show that our shape restriction q
 
a10; a1
  q  a20; a1
(as a10 < a
2
0) is necessary for the SRP condition analogous to (11) to have an admissible solution.
With more budget sets, the corresponding higher dimensional matrix equations analogous to (11)
quickly become operationally impractical and cumbersome, as is well-known in the literature (see
introduction). In contrast, our shape-restrictions, by being global conditions on the q (; ) functions,
remain invariant to which and how many budget sets are considered. Furthermore, we already know
via Theorem 1 above, that these shape restrictions are also su¢ cient for rationalizability for any
collection nite or innite of budget sets.6
I. Observed Covariates: One can accommodate observed covariates in our theorem. For
example, letX denote a vector of observed covariates, and let q (a; b; x) denote the choice probability
when Y = a, Y   P = b and X = x. If for each xed x, q (a; b; x) satises the same properties as
(i) A-C in the statement of Theorem 1, then letting
q 1 (u; b; x) def= sup fz : q (z; b; x)  ug ,
we can rationalize the choice probabilities q (a; b; x) by setting W1 (y   p; V; x)  q 1 (V; y   p; x)
and W0 (y; V; x)  y, where V ' U (0; 1).
J. Endogeneity: Our results in Theorem 1 are stated in terms of structural choice probabil-
ities q (; ). If budget sets are independent of unobserved heterogeneity (conditional on observed
covariates), then these structural choice probabilities are equal to the observed conditional choice
probabilities, i.e.,
q (a; b) = Pr (1jY = a; Y   P = b) .
6 It does not seem possible to show directly, i.e. without using Theorem 1, that our shape restrictions are also
su¢ cient for existence of admissible solutions to the analog of (11) corresponding to every arbitrary collection of
budget sets. But given theorem 1, this exercise is probably of limited interest.
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To date, all existing results on rationalizability of demand under heterogeneity, including McFad-
den and Richter, 1990, Lewbel, 2001 and Hausman-Newey, 2016 maintain independence. If the
independence condition is violated (even conditional on observed covariates), then Theorem 1 con-
tinues to remain valid as stated, since it concerns the structural choice probability q (; ), but
consistent estimation of q (; ) will be more involved. In applications, if endogeneity of budget
sets is a potential concern, then it would be advisable to estimate structural choice-probabilities
using methods for estimating average structural functions. A specic example is the method of
control functions, c.f. Blundell and Powell, 2003, which requires that  ? (P; Y ) jV , where V is
an estimable control functiontypically a rst stage residual from a regression of endogenous
covariates on instruments.
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